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Arguments for God's Pure Actuality

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Ethics: Artistic Integrity

Ethics: Rule Utilitarianism

Review of "Natural Atheism"

Review of "Satisficing and Maximizing"

Review of "The Improbability of God"

Saving the Cosmological Argument

A.A. Hodge puts it as follows:

Major Premise. — Every new existence or change in any thing previously existing must have had a cause pre-existing and adequate.

Minor Premise. — The universe as a whole and in all its parts is a system of changes.

Conclusion. — Hence the universe must have a cause exterior to itself, and the ultimate or absolute cause must be eternal, uncaused, and unchangeable. (Outlines of Theology, 33)

A simple refutation of this argument consists in asking for an example of a change or series of changes which terminate in God. Forget that constant motion is a change in relative position that does not require any cause at all. Consider the following cases in which some change is occurring:

  1. A body accelerating toward earth.
  2. Radioactive decay.
  3. Digestion of food in an animal’s stomach.
  4. Thinking about a philosophical problem.

To quote Aquinas, “it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God’s existence.” (ST, I, 2, 3, obj. 2) In other words, in the examples above, where is God’s place? Where is He located in the succession of causes? Obviously, nowhere.

In order to move anywhere with this argument, let me quote from a previous post:

The causal dispositions theory, championed also by Swinburne, is similar to the nomic necessity theory in that they endow laws with ontological presence. But unlike that second theory, laws reside not in the mind of the lawgiver but in the essences of things, such that each thing’s essence contains within itself a complete set of instructions regarding how that thing will interact with other objects in every conceivable set of circumstances. For example, dissolving in water is the property or, in the parlance of object-oriented computer programming, “method” of the essence of salt, and dissolving salt is a method of water. …

This theory’s appeal is that it exalts what Whitehead would call “actual entities” by saying that the reality of their being is within them. They are not commanded by some higher being, such as God, slavishly obeying His decrees; on the contrary, they themselves know how to behave appropriately. They have the initiative and power and dignity of causation. They act on their own will, unfree though it is. All things then are good by their own goodness rather than God’s.

These “instructions,” aka causal dispositions or tendencies, within the essences of things are there whether those things are changing or not. Even space/time, too, follows directions that are inherent in it. In other words, the universe knows where to go next quite well on its own. The universe, then, is a system of dynamic actual entities. Now we can say that either these entities transformed into one another, faithfully following the directions burned into them, forever; or there exists a terminus, a thing or being which caused or created the actual entities without itself being caused. Since infinite regress is to be avoided, we conclude that there must be a programmer who infused the code into each and every actual entity, according to which that entity must act, while Himself remaining uncaused and incapable of (substantial) change. Or, rather, it has only one instruction or even is only one instruction, and that is “be.” And that’s what we call God.

Further, God is not only uncaused but unmoved and unmovable, as well. In other words, there is no object relative to which God is moving, nor is there an object relative to which He is stationary. To ascribe motion to God is to make a category mistake. For God as the uncaused cause presumably created space/time, as well. Hence it is natural for God to exist outside the created universe, outside space/time. Hence God qua God, of His own nature, cannot move within space.

This is useful when we want to prove that, for example, God is not a body.

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