On Ethical Non-Cognitivism
The problem with non-cognitivism is its failure to recognize the distinction between “the good” and loving the good. Now there are three kinds of good and evil: metaphysical, moral, and physical. NCs conflate moral good or the good of accidents (such as virtue, wisdom) with physical good or the good of happiness. Physical good is purely subjective, i.e., something is a good, because I value it, because it brings happiness to me, and that’s that. I first value something, and then and because of it it becomes good. Metaphysical good is objective, so first something is good, and then I had better value it (or else). Moral good is in between, inter-subjective, deriving its character from agreement by rational agents. All human law is inter-subjective. All natural law is inter-subjective, as well. Even in the case of a person on a deserted island, there is a law governing what he can do to himself. Perhaps we can say that there is a trace of Trinity within all of us, and so even relations with oneself are inter-subjective. I’ll always remember Eric Hoffer’s mention of “communion with oneself.”
(Socrates is better than a pig metaphysically; adult and virtuous Socrates is better than infant or vicious Socrates morally; and Socrates satisfied is better than Socrates dissatisfied physically.)
Thus, metaphysical good does not need a soul to be good, physical good requires a soul to be good, and moral good is the result of a soul judging itself. Again, we may call formally the subject evaluating and knowing the father; the object known, the son; and the love between the too or self-love, the holy spirit. Moral good, therefore, is perfection (in its 4 aspects) known as such and in itself and loved.
What all this has to do with non-cognitivism is that this doctrine focuses upon love while ignoring the perfection that is loved. In our case, torturing is against the law (again, inter-subjective). Therefore it is wrong. And we can also know that it is wrong and hate its wrongness.