Rethinking the Prime Mover and First Cause Arguments
On p. 32 of The Improbability of God Theodore Schick Jr. writes that “An infinitely long causal chain is not a logical impossibility. Most of us have no trouble conceiving of the universe existing infinitely into the future. Similarly we should have no trouble conceiving of it existing infinitely long into the past.” Actually, I do have trouble conceiving of such a thing. Schick’s error is that he does not distinguish between the merely potential infinity of everlasting future life of the universe (or of the blessed in heaven) and the actual infinity of seconds, say, which must, by now, have elapsed in the universe with no beginning.
Schick quotes Aquinas’s second way, but he fails to get it right. Aquinas’s first and second ways do not deal with causes stretching back into past at all; but with simultaneous causation. For example, the mind moves the arm, the arm moves a pool stick, the stick moves the first billiard ball, that first ball (after a short period of time) moves another ball, that other ball is reflected by the pool table’s side, etc. The claim is that a car could not run without an engine even if it had an infinite number of gears (all exerting force on each other simultaneously) or an army could not move forward without the general even if it had an infinity of junior officers.
Now as stated, Aquinas’s first way does not work, because our author assumes, according to his Aristotelian physics, that if something is moving, then something else must be dragging it through space. But we know that constant motion is physically indistinguishable from rest. All motion is relative; so obviously, a thing cannot be both being dragged and not being dragged at the same time. Even accelerated motion due to gravity is like constant motion in curved space. Moreover, the first way seems to be a special case of the second way. The former deals with causes of motion, changes in motion, and energy transfers; the latter, with any effect, including existences of things.
The question at this point is the place of God in this series of causes. Aquinas himself raises an objection: “everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.” (ST, I, 2, 3, obj 2) I would reply that God acts on the level of natural laws, sustaining them or causing them. Let’s start with the regularity theory of natural law. I write that “Laws merely describe what actually occurs, and it is our luck that what actually occurs is regular.” But even if laws are merely “mind-dependent inductive generalizations resulting in mental categories of cause and effect,” nonetheless it must be explained why things behave regularly. Any kind of determination entails a form or information imparted into a thing. In our case, the thing is nature as a whole. It is well-known that there are generally two ways in which something can be perfected: evolution via trial-and-error and intelligent design. We also know that natural laws evolved as time went by after the Big Bang and its infinitely chaotic singularity, though I am not sure if by trial-and-error. But if it could be shown that this evolution did not have sufficient powers to determine the natural laws to their present highly refined and sophisticated state, then we would have to postulate a designing intelligence. And that everyone understands to be God.
Continuing further, the nomic necessity theory makes things even easier for us: “Laws are not self-enforcing. If we accept nomic necessity, then laws must reside in the mind of and be willed by a lawgiver. If we assume that the lawgiver is God, then it is He who enforces the natural laws.” And if we prefer the causal dispositions theory, then we must admit a designing intelligence which would be the programmer of actual entities, imparting instructions to them on how to act. The First Cause then defines the essences of things; it does not, as Peter Kreeft would have it in his Handbook of Christian Apologetics, deal with their existences. (For example, at this point we have no way of showing that quarks and electrons depend on something for their existence.) Aquinas’s third way (“from time and contingency”) can be interpreted as proving that there must be an entity whose existence is part of its very nature. But not the second way.
Schick writes that some things, such as vacuum fluctuations, seem to occur without a cause. Of course, that’s not true. These fluctuations, like also constant motion, are caused by the nature of space and properties of matter. Unpredictability by humans entails nether unpredictability by God nor being completely uncaused; perhaps there are probabilistic laws which govern the occurrence of virtual particles. But the universe, if it began to exist, had nothing in which to fluctuate.
Thus, God makes it so that causes produce their effects. And establishing these causal connections, the rules of the game, is prior to any specific cause causing some specific effect. Hence God can be called “Prime Mover” inasmuch as He inserts Himself between the mover and moved, whereby there is a change in motion, such as momentum or direction; and “First Cause” as the world’s programmer or lawgiver. (In the next post I will examine Quentin Smith’s contention that God is irrational, because He made a universe that required constant intervention.) As such God Himself is unmoved and uncaused, the latter in the sense that He is the law unto Himself. We can even deduce from this certain attributes of God. (1) God is not a body. (2) The principles of God’s operation must be perfectly determinate which means that God is pure act. (3) God’s acts must reveal His essence perfectly. (4) God’s acts are His essence. (5) There is only one such act, because if there were more than one, then none of them would clarify God’s essence perfectly. (6) God’s essence is one or simple.
We can conceive of God’s role as follows: Cause C wants to create effect E. To that end, being determined, it knows what to ask God, according to the law: “May I produce E?,” to which God normally replies: “Sure,” or even He goes ahead and produces E on behalf of C. (Note that this last suggestion does not reduce the first cause into a tertiary force which executes the orders of C; rather, it is an act of justice: “It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition.” (ST, I, 21, 1, ad 3)) So, a secondary cause proposes but the first cause disposes.
Posted: April 20th, 2008 under Philosophy, Religion.
Comments
Comment from thomist
Time April 23, 2008 at 9:09 am
“Now as stated, Aquinas’s first way does not work, because our author assumes, according to his Aristotelian physics, that if something is moving, then something else must be dragging it through space. But we know that constant motion is physically indistinguishable from rest.”
A mobile, as such, is able to move. Something in motion is actually moving. whatever accounts for the actuality is the mover, regardless of whether it is in the mobile or outside of it.
Your talk of “physically indistinguishable” is taken from mathematical physics, which studies motion as measured, and since we set fixed points to measure from, we it can decide by mere hypothesis what we consider moving or resting. It is fine to study motion this way, but a general consideration of motion is distinct from this. As long as you say that what is able to move, as such, is not necessarily in motion, then Aquinas’ proof is fine. If you deny this, you are saying that all things that can be in motion must be in motion, which is simply irrational.
In brief, the mathematical and metrical account of motion doesn’t exaust everything we know about motion.
Comment from thomist
Time April 23, 2008 at 9:22 am
Note that it’s important to translate the major premise of the proof correctly: “Everything that is in motion is being moved by another”.
The reason for this is what is “in motion”, properly speaking, is a mobile, and a mobile is able to be in motion . That’s why we put the -ble suffix on the end. Why is something that is able to be in motion (ability is a potency) actually in motion (an act). It can’t be in virtue of itself, so it must be in virue of another. Whether that other is inside or outside the mobile, pulling or dragging it, or even unknown is irrelevant to the proof.
Again, modern mathematical physics doesn’t care about these questions, and they are perfectly irrelevant to its purpose. This is completly fine. I don’t say that physics is incomplete in any way, or in any way false. I’m saying there is another consideration one can make about motion- which is the consideration St. Thomas is making.
Comment from Dmitry Chernikov
Time April 23, 2008 at 11:41 am
> Something in motion is actually moving.
Relative to what? If I’m driving a car at 70 mph, then I am moving at this speed relative to the road, not moving at all relative to my car, moving at -5 mph relative to a car that is overtaking me, and moving at some very high speed relative to the sun.
By physically indistinguishable I mean, according to Wikipedia, that “A fundamental principle of all physics is the equivalence of inertial reference frames. In practical terms, this equivalence means that scientists within an enclosed box moving uniformly cannot determine their velocity by any experiment done exclusively inside the box.” In other words, “in all inertial frames, all laws of physics are the same.”
> As long as you say that what is able to move, as such, is not necessarily in motion, then Aquinas’ proof is fine. If you deny this, you are saying that all things that can be in motion must be in motion, which is simply irrational.
Actually, very likely there exist numerous reference frames relative to which all things in the universe are in motion.
But suppose that for all reference frames there is some object that is at rest relative to that frame. So what? How does that help Aquinas?
Nothing must be in motion (except such things as molecular motion), but anything can be brought into motion simply by moving the abstract coordinate system comprising our inertial frame.
> Why is something that is able to be in motion (ability is a potency) actually in motion (an act).
An act is a power of a thing in use. But being in constant motion relative to A requires no exertion of power, no manifestation of essence, any more than being at rest relative to B.
> It can’t be in virtue of itself, so it must be in virue of another. Whether that other is inside or outside the mobile, pulling or dragging it, or even unknown is irrelevant to the proof.
It’s in virtue neither of itself nor of another, unless by another we mean the properties of space and matter, the laws of nature that make constant linear motion do what it does.
Comment from thomist
Time April 23, 2008 at 12:46 pm
Dmitry,
You are quoting modern mathematical and metrical physics at me. I have clearly distinguished Aquinas’ claim from the way modern Physics studies motion. Did you read what I said? Please, no more modern physics! I am quite insistant that the first way does not work with the account of motion proper to modern Physics. Do you think you will find act and potency in a physics textbook? of course not. Do you read a refutation of why motion is the act of potency so far as it is potency in a physics book? of course not. But this is the sort of consideration one must have.
What the motion is relative to doesn’t matter. Only that something is moving, regardless of what it is- or even if we can’t know what it is. Wave your hand back and forth. That’s a good example. Are you in doubt that you are moving your hand when you wave it back and forth? If you can’t know this, what hope do you have to understand the existence of God? So something is in motion. That’s all the first way needs to start.
And what is your answer to “if something can move, it therefore must move”? Your answer and avoids the question. I say it’s a false statement. You?
“an act is a power of a thing in use” Aristotle does not limit it to this, which, lest you forget, was whom you were supposed to be giving a critique of.
Comment from Dmitry Chernikov
Time April 23, 2008 at 9:27 pm
> I am quite insistant that the first way does not work with the account of motion proper to modern Physics.
So, it does not work with… correct physics? What science other than physics is qualified to study motion? Doesn’t “meta” in “metaphysics” mean “after” physics (at least in Aristotle)? Let’s study physics first, and metaphysics, second.
> Do you think you will find act and potency in a physics textbook?
Yes, e.g., potential and kinetic energy.
> Do you read a refutation of why motion is the act of potency so far as it is potency in a physics book?
I deny that uniform motion is an act of potency. Look, what you are saying, I think, is that motion is real. And you are right: if you are driving at 70 mph and hit a brick wall, you will be instantly convinced of that. Time will slow down if you are traveling close to the speed of light. But on the other hand, motion is the most irrelevant accident of matter. It is strange to begin one’s discussion of the existence of God by focusing on something so peripheral.
> Wave your hand back and forth. That’s a good example. Are you in doubt that you are moving your hand when you wave it back and forth? If you can’t know this, what hope do you have to understand the existence of God? So something is in motion. That’s all the first way needs to start.
Well, waving my hand is not uniform motion. I am dragging the hand through the air. No, I am not in doubt that my hand is moving relative to me. But let’s continue with the chain of movers. Where does God enter into the picture? Is He moving me? Or is something else moving me (e.g., my desires), and God is moving that?
I try to argue that God is moving things on the level of natural laws, by connecting causes and effects. Why is that wrong?
Comment from Clayton
Time April 23, 2008 at 11:19 pm
I’ve always been puzzled by this talk about potential and actual infinity. It’s not just that the distinction itself strikes me as odd (since those who draw it typically say that actual infinites are impossible), but it seems to me that it is unwise for the theist to say there cannot be actual infinites.
Ought we say that if God is essentially omniscient God has an infinite collection of beliefs or not? If not, it’s hard to make sense of the idea that God is essentially infinite. If so, it’s hard to see how good the arguments could be against actual infinites. Think about the first horn. There’s presumably an infinite collection of merely possible worlds. Will there be truths about these possibilities unknown to God? Even if you thought that there were essentially unknowable truths here, the crucial question is whether there is an infinite collection of knowable truths here. If there is, there’s a possible being that knows them. God should know them as well in actuality. But, if God does have an infinite collection of beliefs, we can run all the thought experiments Craig and the like run against actual infinites. Either they show that there’s no being that has an infinite collection of beliefs and there’s no God or they show nothing. Myself, I think they show nothing. That’s just me.
Comment from Dmitry Chernikov
Time April 24, 2008 at 12:21 pm
Clayton, I think we can say that there cannot exist
- an actually infinitely long stick
- an actually infinite number of atoms in the universe
- an actually infinite number of seconds which have elapsed before getting to the present moment.
Furthermore, it is impossible to form an actual infinite set by adding one member to it after another. Similarly, it is impossible to make an infinite set finite by removing from the set one member after another. For example, you can’t count up from -∞ to 0; -∞ + 1 is still -∞.
Now as to God… Aquinas writes that “to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively…” (ST, I, 14, 12, ad 1) Take it for what it’s worth.
Also, I wrote that “God is infinite form, which means that to describe him would require an actually infinite amount of information.” But information is not anything material like a stick, nor does it need to be traversed step by step like time. Therefore, it seems that there can exist an infinite amount of it.
Comment from Clayton
Time April 24, 2008 at 3:58 pm
Hmmmm…..
Craig’s thought experiments designed to show that there cannot be actual infinites work just as well against a God with an infinite number of beliefs as a library with an infinite number of volumes. Maybe you have some reason to deny there could be actual infinites that apply only to material objects, but I’d be curious to know what they are. I’d like to know why you are so confident that it could not have been that there is an infinite collection of moments prior to this one that have elapsed.
Is the idea supposed to be this:
Furthermore, it is impossible to form an actual infinite set by adding one member to it after another
That’s not true. Take the set of even numbers. Add 3. New set. It’s infinite. It’s true that you cannot generate an infinite set by successive addition if you do not start with an infinite set. But you cannot use that to show there cannot be “an actually infinite number of seconds which have elapsed before getting to the present moment” because you need to assume that the process of adding time, as it were, to the universe began a finite time before this. That’s just patently question begging.
I have no real idea what Aquinas is saying. Are you denying that God has knowledge of an infinite number of distinct propositions?
Comment from Dmitry Chernikov
Time April 24, 2008 at 6:42 pm
> Craig’s thought experiments designed to show that there cannot be actual infinites work just as well against a God with an infinite number of beliefs as a library with an infinite number of volumes. Maybe you have some reason to deny there could be actual infinites that apply only to material objects, but I’d be curious to know what they are.
If each belief is stored in one of God’s physical memory locations, then yes, Craig may have dealt a blow to classical theism. But in God information is not encoded in matter, like data on a CD; God is not a combination of form and matter; He is pure form. The question you are asking is why there can not be an infinite amount of matter yet can be an infinite amount of information.
Some ideas: It seems that every material object must have a shape, and a thing infinite in magnitude will not have one. Any real (as opposed to abstract) multitude is determined by some actual number, which seems fairly self-evident. But no actual number is infinite: “infinity” is not a number. Another reason in favor of the same conclusion is that the universe is ordered or rational, and this requires that all things in it be finite in number or size so as to be in finite proportion or ratio to each other. For if there were some infinite multitude, then it would overwhelm all the other created things and destroy the congruity of the universe, throw it out of balance. (Of course, this does not prove that an infinite body or multitude of things cannot exist in every possible world, some of which could conceivably be infinite, but only in ours.)
As for information, there is surely an infinite amount of it even in this world: “1 is a number,” “2 is a number,” …
> I have no real idea what Aquinas is saying. Are you denying that God has knowledge of an infinite number of distinct propositions?
Well, an infinite amount of information can be contained in its entirety by an infinite being, being not received in anything and therefore not limited by anything. All beliefs, including beliefs in propositions such as “2 + 2 = 4″ might pre-exist in God in a kind natural unity, as one and as in the first cause, in harmony with His simplicity.
> It’s true that you cannot generate an infinite set by successive addition if you do not start with an infinite set. But you cannot use that to show there cannot be “an actually infinite number of seconds which have elapsed before getting to the present moment” because you need to assume that the process of adding time, as it were, to the universe began a finite time before this. That’s just patently question begging.
OK, let me refer to Aquinas briefly who does not like the kalam argument and responds to it thusly: “Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through.” (ST, I, 46, 2, ad 6) Craig is unimpressed: “the issue is how the whole series can be formed, not a finite portion of it.” (Reasonable Faith, 100) Now you seem to be saying to that that whatever bygone day we choose, we already have an actually infinite series of days still more in the past assembled, and adding to it a finite number of days (from then till now) gives us a similar actual infinite. Craig could simply reply that not only now but any such bygone day could not have been arrived at, because it requires one to pass through an infinite medium. But then you could counter as follows: suppose that we are somehow passing through such a medium. We’re passing, passing, passing for awhile, and now find ourselves somewhere. But from that point until now there must be a finite distance! Hence today will inevitably come. Odd, isn’t it?
Pingback from Fides Quaerens Intellectum » Dmitry Takes on The Improbability of God
Time April 22, 2008 at 4:07 pm
[...] a series of posts that critically responds to essays in The Improbability of God. Topics include: First Mover/Cause Argument, Quentin Smith and the Big Bang, Quentin Smith and the Big Bang 2, The Argument from Scale, The [...]