Dmitry Chernikov’s Blog

Martin falls victim to the grossest possible anthropomorphism. Repeatedly, he makes an argument of the following form:

(1) In terms of our experience, all created entities of the kinds we have so far examined are created by one or more beings with bodies. [Empirical evidence]

(2) The universe is a created entity. [Supposition]

(2a) If the universe is a created entity, then it is of the same kind as the created entities we have so far examined. [Empirical evidence]

[Probably]
(3) The universe was created by one or more beings with bodies. [From (1), (2), and (2a) by predictive inference]

(4) If the theistic God exists, then the universe was not created by a being with a body. [Analytic truth]

[Therefore]
(5) The theistic God does not exist. [From (3) and (4) by modus tollens] (The Improbability of God, 203)

In an analogous manner Martin “proves” that there must likely have been multiple creators, fallible, finite, and working with preexisting matter. In other words, if there is a God, then He is very much like a committee of human beings aided perhaps with superior technology.

In (1) Martin refers to the numerous man-made objects we find ourselves surrounded with. But why does making those objects require that their creators have bodies? Naturally, to move around and manipulate particles of matter as secondary causes. This does not show that the universe as a whole, which is not “of the same kind as the created entities we have so far examined” (nor is it merely “infinitely larger, older, and more complex than any created object we have ever experienced.” (204)) but is rather everything that’s been created was not made by a disembodied intelligence acting as the first cause. This is because nature as revealed by “our experience” can be shown to be incomplete without the theistic (disembodied) God — incomplete even if we disregard the fact that God’s grace can often also be detected and serve as evidence for His existence. In other words, our methodology of doing natural theology is not that of a primitive superstitious savage, as Martin would slander it.

I’ve already attempted to show how the prime mover and first cause complete the universe. The argument from time and contingency, for example, works similarly by showing that God, unlike creatures, by nature has no potentiality not to exist. We can further demonstrate that God’s existence is “in” His very essence. The argument from degrees of ontological perfection establishes God as the best being and source of all goodness in creatures. And so on.

Further, we can prove that God has no body directly. Suppose that a being with a body made the universe. Clearly, the embodied creator must be locatable in space. But space itself was created! And if God existed in some sort of quasi-space (also presumably 3-dimensional), then the natural question is, where did that space come from and why? God couldn’t have made a body for Himself for, say, His own convenience, because His nature is already complete. So, we don’t get anywhere with this.

Here are more proofs from ST, I, 3, 1, reproduced for your convenience. (1) If God is the Prime Mover, then He cannot move, and since every body can be put in motion relative to something, God cannot have a body. (2) Bodies can be divided into parts, but if God is pure act (as can be shown independently), then He can’t be potential to being divided in, say, half. Nor can God be an indivisible elementary particle like an electron, because that is potential to being combined into compounds. (3) Finally, if we establish that God is the source of all perfection (as per Aquinas’s fourth way), then if He has a body, there is in Him something manifestly imperfect. This is because living bodies are not mere robots; they are animated by some lifeforce or soul. But living things are metaphysically better than non-living things precisely by virtue of this animating power. Hence this power in its purest form without even a body to dilute itself with must be what God is, which turns out to be a disembodied soul or mind or spirit.

For proof of the fact that God is one, see ST, I, 11, 3. That even “prime matter” was created is established in I, 44, 2. And so on with the rest of Martin’s arguments. (I am letting Aquinas do my work for me, because it is clear that our author has not read him at all, and it is his responsibility to engage St. Thomas and try to rebut him.)

Furthermore, we can demonstrate through negative theology that God is unlike anything found in the created world. Aquinas does it with panache in ST, I, 3, and if he succeeds, then Martin’s arguments fail.

Before making a thing, a human being first desires that it be made. Then he plans his course of action. Both of these are immaterial. Only then does the mind command the body to move. Transformation of objects or production is therefore a fusion of spirit and matter. But omnipotent power can be such as to command that something be produced without the use of a body; in fact, producing an effect simply by speaking “Let there be…” we may take as the very definition of omnipotence. The question is, is there any reason to ascribe such an attribute to God? Again I refer our author to Aquinas, ST, I, 25.

And so Martin’s objections seem neatly taken care of.