Is Middle Knowledge Viciously Circular?
The IEP sets out the objection:
Proponents of this objection point out that, according to Molinism, the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom must be prior to God’s creating activity because they inform His creative decision. However, under the standard possible worlds analysis, which counterfactuals are true is dependent upon which world is actual (counterfactuals are true if they are true in the closest possible-but-not-actual world to the actual world). Thus, which world is actual (and presumably, how close all possible worlds are to it) must be prior to God’s knowledge of the true counterfactuals. But this means that God’s creative decision must be prior to God’s creative decision! Thus, middle knowledge is circular.
Let it be that if P were in C, then he’d do A. In the possible world W which interests us, P is in C and hence does A. W is fully specified and self-sufficient; we do not need to connect it to any actual world in which P is not in C. In fact, the real counterfactual is this: if God were to actualize W, A would occur. The actual world relative to which this counterfactual is evaluated is the world prior to God’s decision to create — an empty world containing only God. But our counterfactual is self-evidently true, because in the possible meta-world, in which God actualizes W, A indeed happens. So, there is no circularity.
July 1st, 2008 at 4:51 pm
‘Let it be that if P were in C, then he’d do A.’
Presumably C includes an omniscient being who knows that P will do A.
C’ is a very, very similar world to C, except for the content of the knowledge of the omniscient being. That is the one difference. (Libertarian free will guarantees the existence of C’, a world identical to C, except for the content of the knowledge of any omniscient being(s)
In C’, the omniscient being knows P will not do A.
If God actualises C, P will do A.
If God actualises the slightly different world C’, P will not do A.
Where is the circularity?
July 1st, 2008 at 6:04 pm
> Presumably C includes an omniscient being who knows that P will do A.
It might, but what does it matter to P?
> Libertarian free will guarantees the existence of C’, a world identical to C, except for the content of the knowledge of any omniscient being(s)
I’m not a libertarian, so I don’t think that’s true.
> In C’, the omniscient being knows P will not do A.
So, there are two differences, not one: (1) P does not do A and (2) God knows it.
The circularity appears to exist because middle knowledge is expressed counterfactually. “if P were in C, then he’d do A” presupposes the actual world as the background context of P’s being in C, such as the mostly unchanged history of the world (unless we admit backtracking counterfactuals) up to the moment in which P is in C. So, world W, in which P is in C, must be very much like the actual world with deviations from it described by C. But until W is actualized, there is no actual world. So, what do we mean when we say “P is in C”? When P is in C is it day or night? Is it warm or cold? If we had the actual world, we could answer these questions. But we don’t; herein lies the objection.
In this case, however, C extends not to the actual world + some counter-to-fact difference like P’s being in C rather than, as things are in the actual world, not, but to everything in W. C describes W completely. It’s an ideal and fully-functional world in God’s mind prior to creation. As God scans this world from beginning to end, he notices that at some moment this world will look like C; P will be in it and be part of the description provided by C; and P will do A.
So, as I argue, the actual world relative to which we examine the counterfactual “if God were to actualize W, A would occur” is the world prior to creation. Here God is in act in His eternal moment and is contemplating possibilities. The meta-world in which God actualizes W is exactly like the actual world except for that event, especially because God’s 1st and 2nd levels do not change at all.