Memory and Personal Identity
To illustrate some of the issues involved in the relationship between memory and enduring personal identity, Sydney Shoemaker and Derek Parfit postulate something they call quasi- or q-memory, that is, memory of either oneself doing A or someone else doing A but as though he were doing it, which Shoemaker calls memory “from the inside”; or memory of an event E due to either one’s own witnessing E or someone else’s witnessing E, called memory “from the outside.” Every instance of normal memory is an instance of q-memory, but the reverse obviously does not hold (because a q-memory might not in fact be one’s own). Further, in the actual world memory and q-memory are the same, but there exist possible worlds in which they are not the same. Now both authors consider the same objection to this division, e.g., Parfit:
One might say, “My apparent memory of having an experience is an apparent memory of my having an experience. So how could I q-remember my having other people’s experiences?”
This objection rests on a mistake. When I seem to remember an experience, I do indeed seem to remember having it. But it cannot be a part of what I seem to remember about this experience that I, the person who now seems to remember it, am the person who had the experience. That I am is something that I automatically assume. (Metaphysics: An Anthology, 370)
The first problem is metaphysical. For it is presupposed in my having a q-memory of someone else’s acting or witnessing an event that it was indeed someone else. But why can we not interpret the notion of personal identity such that I will be that very person? The argument that a certain genuine q-memory which is not also normal memory is occurring to me right now depends on the numerical distinction between me and the other person whose experience I am remembering. But it is precisely on that distinction that our memory examples are supposed to shed light. Our authors are basing an explanation on very phenomenon to be explained. It might be objected that I end at my body’s limits, and so does everyone else. But why must this be so? That in possible world W my personal identity may span bodies is no more outrageous a supposition than that in W I have the capacity to remember experiencing what allegedly other people (but perhaps as a matter of fact my very self) are doing from the inside.
My second comment will concern the epistemology of q-memory. If I remember P’s doing A as if I were doing A, how can banish from my mind the false belief that I and not P did A? Suppose there is a contradiction between two memories in my mind: on the one hand, I seem to remember visiting my grandmother at 4pm; on the other, I remember working on this blog entry at 4pm. Which memory is the real one? I don’t think there would be a way to tell. My and other people’s lives would be intertwined in my mind, such that to pry them apart and tell them from each other would be next to impossible.
The third problem is psychological, Again, experience is all we have. The I of personal identity is built up from experiences; and it is manifested and revealed in experience. Feeling other people’s sensations and thoughts and emotions will leave an indelible mark on one’s own personality. How, for example, are two different characters to be integrated if they have contrary to each other habits? Even if one were not those other people, even if it were possible to tell one’s own experiences from other’s experiences, being so closely united to them would easily alter one’s own character and even human nature in profound ways. Normally, one is closest and substantially united with himself, but allowing q-memories will cause one to be united at least almost as closely to other people. One would know, for example, their secret thoughts, something reserved for God alone. One would feel as responsible for others as he would for himself. It would wreak havoc with being human.
Thus, q-memories are hardly a coherent device. If they are therefore impossible, and we do have special epistemic access to our own pasts, then there is a chance that the memory criterion of personal identity will not be circular and will not be false.