The Case of a Ruritanian Philosopher: Solution
Note that the puzzle is that utilitarianism seems to sanction or even mandate genocide. Yet utilitarianism is a respectable moral theory. So, what goes wrong? Here are several suggestions:
1. That genocide of “inferior” people is legitimate is a dangerous rule. It is a distinct possibility that the people of Ruritania may themselves split into hostile groups (such as the redheads and the redheads-haters), such that it will be demanded that one group (”we”) exterminate the other (”them”), too. Logically, this process of mutual slaughter need not stop until only one person remains.
2. In particular, the rule that the smart can rightfully kill the stupid is easily generalized into the permission or even duty for smart Ruritanians to kill stupid Ruritanians. This is ominous, as it entails also that the smartest Ruritanian has the right to liquidate everyone else in Ruritania.
3. We can accuse the philosopher of not knowing the law of comparative advantage / association. On the free market the “strong” or “smart” do not prey on the “weak” and “stupid”; the strong will benefit from dividing labor with the weak even if he is better that the weak at the both or however many tasks being divided.
4. Violence need not be involved in the process of colonizing Waldavia. If the land and resources are unowned, as would likely be the case with only hunters-gatherers inhabiting Waldavia, then Ruritanian businessmen can exploit its land without asking anyone’s permission. If they are owned, then they can be bought from the Waldavian tribes, possibly cheaply, and, again, developed without violating anyone’s rights to life and property. And, once again, killing to steal is a bad and decivilizing rule, as it habituates the aggressors to do the same with their fellow Ruritanians, as well. In fact, it is likely that the Ruritanians have achieved their level of civilization precisely by scrupulously adhering to universal moral laws. If they had been predatory, then they would not be “smart” as the puzzle postulates.
5. Whose welfare do we care for? Utilitarianism takes benevolence as a given. Whatever the group (which may be everyone in the world) we love, (rule) utilitarianism recommends institutions, practices, character traits that will maximize general happiness over that group. It may thus be objected to the philosopher’s argument that we value the happiness of the present occupants of Waldavia, as well. Hence killing them will be contrary to his own moral theory.
6. If it is replied to (5) that the disutility of removing the Waldavians will be outweighed by the utility (experienced perhaps by as yet unborn people) of colonizing their land for reasons described, then we may refer back to (1)-(4). But in addition, if the Waldavians really are stupid, then they will enjoy lessened income in the integrated Ruritania-Waldavia economy. (Though the Waldavians will still benefit tremendously from being part of social cooperation.) Therefore, given also their small numbers, their claim on social resources will be vanishingly small. There is therefore no need to wipe them out even from the Ruritanian philosopher’s point of view; the market economy will naturally assign to the Waldavians a lower place in the social hierarchy, such that they may be quite invisible to the Ruritanian common man.
This puzzle can be rephrased in a stark way. Let A be the actual world, and P be an actual person within A with IQ / virtues / happiness equal to some number n, assuming contrary to reason that these things can be measured. Now let W be a possible world which is exactly like A except that P is replaced with Q whose IQ / virtues / happiness are equal to 2n. (Of course, replacing even a single person is bound to upset and reconfigure the entire existing society and production structure. So, the differences between A and W may be far greater than it would seem at first glance. But let’s put that point aside.) Two questions need to be considered here. First, is W better in some sense than A? Second, if W is indeed better, can we get from A to W by killing P and having some couple have another child who will grow up to be Q?
I think the answer to the first question is yes, and to the second, no, for two reasons. First, more sophisticated utilitarianism will not argue that utility can be increased in this manner. Some of the reasons why not I outline above. Second, suppose you have a kid who is, say, 15 years old or even a pet cat you’ve had for awhile; and let someone offer you a deal: he will kill your child or your cat and give you instead a better (in some sense) one. Would you accept? Of course not! You love that child, that cat for what they are. They are genuinely irreplaceable. So, if even utilitarianism commends charity and love for our fellow men, we cannot start killing people we love to replace them with better versions of themselves. That would devalue our love, substituting for it a kind of eugenics program, wherein we do not value people for their own sake nor think of them as subjects but seek to satisfy some aesthetic view of society, e.g., by allowing only “beautiful people” to live, thinking of people as mere objects, means to ends.
In addition, the problem of replacing people in this manner with regard to total (though not average) happiness could only arise in practice when the human population is at its optimal level, such that either to increase it or decrease it would yield less (overall) utility. But that limit has not been reached and will not be reached for a long time (if ever), given our commitment to freedom and capitalism.