Dmitry Chernikov’s Blog

Danny Shahar believes that they are to extent legitimate.

Suppose you are facing a choice between A, B, and C, and you have ranked satisfaction C higher than B, and B, higher than A. The question is, is it ever legitimate to say that the “distance in happiness” between C and B is greater or lesser than the distance in happiness between B and A?

You would measure the distance by feeling it, by sort of introspecting and asking what you want and how much you want it. Obviously there is no way to assign precise numbers to utilities, but one might be able to do a rough-and-ready gauging of distances. How about this: I would be much happier if someone gave me $1,000,000 as opposed to $2, but only a little bit happier, as in my life wouldn’t really change, if someone gave me $2 as opposed to $1. On the other hand, it’s much more difficult to measure someone else’s distances. I suppose a father can decide which of his children will enjoy a present more. But great insight into a soul, whether your own or another’s, is required.

Rothbard argues that “there is no way whatever of measuring the distance between the rankings; indeed, any concept of such distance is a fallacious one.” But he adds in a footnote: “We might, in some situations, make such comparisons as historians, using imprecise judgment. We cannot, however, do so as praxeologists or economists.” (MESwPM, 258) In other words, it may be true that in daily life we make such comparisons all the time. We may even be good at them. But economists do not spend their time peering into people’s souls. One must construct economic theory without making attempts at comparison of distances between ranked satisfactions and at interpersonal utility comparisons. I think I’m satisfied with that response.