Dmitry Chernikov’s Blog

In the first philosophy book I ever read, Philosophy for Dummies by Thomas Morris (which is a brilliant introduction to numerous philosophical ideas), Morris articulates the “principle of belief conservation.” First he argues that some of our beliefs are rational, or else the term “rational belief” would have neither referent nor meaning. The usefulness of [...]

Aquinas identifies two appetites in human beings, that is, the faculty that seeks and, when found, enjoys pleasure: the sensual appetite and the intellectual appetite, the latter one of which he calls the “will.” Does this distinction correspond to the one between sensation and reflection as two ways of getting knowledge?

According to Locke, primary qualities are qualities like extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. These “inhere” in bodies; that is, the simple ideas produced in human minds by them somehow resemble them. The idea here is that the collection of corpuscles that we perceive as a cup really is shaped like a cup; we [...]

I don’t find the idea of skepticism so scandalous. So what if I don’t know that the sun will rise tomorrow or that I remember the previous steps in my deductive proofs? In practice, in real life I have no doubt that the sun will rise and that I do remember how I reached the [...]

It would seem that they do; e.g., my cat “knows” where his food is. But let’s define knowledge as JTB. It seems that animals are not so much justified in their beliefs as they are successful in their actions, simply because beliefs must be stated in language, and animals don’t use language; they don’t “talk [...]

In addition to a true belief that p, Robert Nozick proposes two more conditions for some person S’s having knowledge: (3) If p were not true, S would not believe that p. (4) If p were true, then S would believe that p. (Philosophical Explanations, 172ff) (3) implies that S’s evidence must not lead him [...]

And that pertains to the issue of skepticism. Indeed, even if we are brains-in-vats stimulated by computers run by evil psychologists or are fully deceived by an evil demon, the these psychologists or this demon must themselves not be deceived but know the truth. I’d even say that it is inconceivable that no one knows [...]

According to this lovely article, a good though fallible justification can be a sign of the truth of a proposition, and also a sign of having knowledge of this proposition, given that it is true: You have no means other than your justification… of determining whether the belief is true; and because the justification is [...]

Johnny-Dee considers an example of a Gettier case which we can put this way. Suppose that both Nogot and Havun are in the room with you. (1) You have a well-justified false belief that Nogot owns a Ford. (2) Hence you have a well-justified belief that someone in the room owns a Ford. (3) That [...]