Satisficing is a term in decision theory and ethics that is opposed to “maximizing” in the sense that in real rather than idealized decisions an agent will pick not the best choice among those that occur to him but an option which is “good enough.” You rate outcomes as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. A satisfactory outcome may differ from one in which you gain the most utility. Byron gives an example of betting, in which calculations of return on bets yield one best outcome, but this outcome is judged “unsatisfactory.” (Satisficing and Maximizing, 3) This is because the agent views a chance to win $250 (B) to be so valuable despite its negligible probability that he prefers it to a chance to win $50 (T) with much greater probability and despite also the fact that calculations seem to point toward the latter as the best bet. Now is it irrational to choose B over T? Not necessarily; perhaps our betting man is a risk-preferrer who thinks little of probabilities. Perhaps the excitement of a chance to win $250 contributes just enough utility to outweigh the other choice. Perhaps he needs exactly $250 to pay off a debt to a loan shark called Vinnie, for otherwise Vinnie will break his legs. OK. But, it may be asked, what if all other things are equal?
To get to the answer, let’s consider Byron’s second example. You prefer Zinfandel to Shiraz. Can you still choose to drink Shiraz if you think it’s good enough? First of all, if you do choose the Shiraz, you have demonstrated to everybody that you “really” prefer it. But secondly, it is not “irrational” to choose the Shiraz; it is absolutely impossible, unless you hate yourself and wish to harm yourself. But even then your desire to harm yourself is satisfied and therefore you are happier than before. As Byron himself notes, “sadomasochists maximize pain.” (7) You might choose the Shiraz if you want to prove the correctness of satisficing. But still you maximize: your greatest happiness consists in finding such a proof. You simply cannot escape from seeking happiness. Now maybe the idea is that you are satisfied with less and you have no desire to pursue anything else. You are at perfect peace with the Shiraz. So, how about: you prefer the Zinfandel, but once you have consumed the Shiraz, you no longer want wine at all. You are satisfied with respect to wine. But surely, had you consumed the Zinfandel, your happiness would be greater. The will rests in the good attained either way, but the rest and satisfaction with Zinfandel is deeper or more intense. Hence, once again, under the normal assumption that you will good to yourself, you can’t choose the Shiraz. We will deal with the distinction between peace and joy and whether human desires are unlimited and in what sense later.
Thus, choosing B in our betting case is likewise impossible (so long as the cost of calculating the relevant utilities is not counted).
Finding something “good enough” can serve as a “stopping rule” to avoid further search, our author writes. But this is still maximizing, if one expects that the costs of continuing the search are likely to be greater than the benefit of the possibility of finding something better.
Byron writes that finding a satisfactory solution might be likened to fulfilling a moral duty, and finding the best solution, to doing something supererogatory, above and beyond duty. But this begs the question: why wouldn’t you apply the best solution, all other things, such as how hard it is to implement each solution, etc., being equal? What possibly stops you from becoming happier than you would be in a non-best situation? Performing duties is hard and has disutility; that’s why we honor saints and heroes who not only do their duty but go beyond it. But becoming better off is by definition pleasant. So, the analogy fails.
Byron invokes the doctrine of moderation. You might choose only one chocolate cake in a cafeteria instead of three. But in this case you are still happier with one piece. Moderation is not pursued for its own sake but for the sake of happiness, because it serves to promote it. There could be all kinds of reasons to pick only one piece: to avoid heartburn, or to lose weight, or for the reasons Aquinas mentions, viz., that “in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to ‘chastise his body, and bring it into subjection’…, by abstinence in food, drink and the like,” (ST, II-I, 63, 4) or whatever else. So, this does not “intuitively” prove satisficing at all. We will consider whether moderation or what is often called “temperance” has an intrinsic value later.
It is suggested that being “under a spell, or in a grip of a passion, or otherwise impaired” may “prevent one from executing a rational choice.” (10) Who is Byron to dictate to people in any situation what is rational? None of these things entail acting on anything other than the top-most desire on your value scales. On the contrary, even when one is under a spell (a wizard’s spell?), one chooses “rationally” except that when the spell has passed, one may regret his choice. But at the very moment of choice one inevitably chooses what he thinks is best.
Our author considers a hypothesis that some values are “incommensurable”; “it will not necessarily be possible to place every pair of alternatives on a common scale such as utility.” (11) This is supposed to be a point in favor of satisficing, because it may not always be possible to maximize. However, I find it a highly implausible contention and agree with Mises who writes, to the contrary: “Choosing determines all human decisions. In making his choice man chooses not only between various material things and services. All human values are offered for option. All ends and all means, both material and ideal issues, the sublime and the base, the noble and the ignoble, are ranged in a single row and subjected to a decision which picks out one thing and sets aside another. Nothing that men aim at or want to avoid remains outside of this arrangement into a unique scale of gradation and preference.” (Human Action, 3) I should add that short-term and long-term projects are also evaluated on the same universal scale of values, subject to the laws of time preference; hence the alleged incommensurability between the perspectives of the “moment” and the “whole life” vanishes away.
Now for the final preliminary critique: Suppose that there are three satisfactory actions open to me. How do I choose between them? Surely, I should pick the one which gives me the greatest psychic profit. So, satisficing actions are in between worse choices and the best choice; they are intermediaries. And they need not take away the onerous task of calculating projected utility. So, what purpose do they serve? My only guess is that they make the choice easier.
To be continued…