Dmitry Chernikov’s Blog

Yes, if we mean that it does not “care” whether it is A or B or C… But there is another sense of indifference. Nature is not indifferent to man’s endeavors to change it, to make it suit his desires better. It allows human beings to manipulate it. If nature were indifferent to men in [...]

It is the essence of every physical object to be able to move and actually to move, because for every object there exists another object somewhere in the universe, relative to which it is moving. But if something is moving relative to something else, then it has relative to that object kinetic energy. So, every [...]

Regarding the kalam argument. Craig has build a huge case for the existence of God based on it. The argument is: (1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause for its coming into being. (2) The universe began to exist. (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause for its coming into being. Craig needs to [...]

Material cause: stinkiness is caused by the predominance of certain molecules in the air, and it “participates” in maximal stinkiness which is a gas or even a solid packed with stinky molecules. Formal cause: the bust of Mises is an imperfect version of the real Mises who is the archetype for the bust. Efficient cause: [...]

A = A. Trivial? Disgusting! On the contrary, I deny that A is A. My desk is not really my desk; it is actually brown. Dmitry Chernikov is not really Dmitry Chernikov; he is actually Napoleon (you knew I’d snap sooner or later, didn’t you?). So, forget it. For no A, except God, is A, [...]

I have several time mentioned Aquinas’s unique statement, made almost in passing in (ST, I, 4, 2, reply 1), that all truths and all ideas exist or pre-exist in God in a “natural unity.” Upon some reflection it seems to me that what Aquinas has in mind here is that God’s knowledge constitutes a system. [...]

Suppose now that we don’t want to appeal to Zeus’ simplicity to prove its pure actuality. So, suppose that Zeus embodies in itself both act and potency; moreover it is the former or creator of everything that is not-Zeus. Is this situation possible? Clearly, if Zeus’ potentiality cannot be actualized, then it may as well [...]

We see in the world things with a mixture of actuality and potentiality. Things are what they are, and being a particular thing carries with it (1) the power to endure and to resist assaults by other things, as well as (2) various powers to influence other things. On the other hand, insofar as nothing [...]

is one in which “all possible grades of existence will actually exist,” says James Chastek. “The universe will be a complete whole with nothing left out.” There is nothing to add, that is, in between plants and animals, animals and men, men and angels, angels and God, etc. In other words, if God were to [...]

I conceive of God as fundamentally a communicator of goodness. Now Aquinas would disagree with me on that; he objects explicitly against this characterization of God as essential to God as follows: “For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the [...]

St. Thomas writes, sensibly, that “an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself” (ST, I, 63, 3), sort of like the problems that would arise from an attempt to turn one into a pillar of salt. He then speculates in what [...]

Among all the things that proceed from the Father, whether by nature or by will, the only metaphysically perfect thing is God the Son. Everything else, that is, every creature, is metaphysically imperfect; moreover, it is essentially, necessarily such. No being which does not have a divine nature, including the universe as whole, can ever [...]

Given that man is a rational animal, his rationality or the intellect and desire for happiness or the will are built on his animality. They are his perfections. But they are posterior to the thing that is perfected. Just as for Aquinas vision of God is prior to and the cause of the delight which [...]

In discussing whether virtues direct acts, Aquinas considers what seems to be a decisive objection. Virtue is a state of affairs, a condition of the soul, a personality, as it were. In particular, if the virtues are divine in nature, then they make a soul Godlike. But what place, then, is there for human operations [...]

Aquinas writes that “virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power… Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore… every evil is a weakness.” (ST, II-I, 55, 3) I think St. Thomas is guilty of [...]

For example, cause → cause’s interest in producing the effect → effect; knower → knowledge/truth → known; lover → love → beloved. Consider especially the last one of these. First, love can be either internal as an emotion and external as a good deed. In its capacity as the former, love can be interested or [...]

I have not understood Aquinas’s idea that creatures are related to God but not God to creatures until now. For we have to recall two things. First, that the true nature of God is goodness, manifested as communication of being. Second, the division of goodness into objective, intersubjective, and subjective. With these tools we can [...]

The contemplation can be of something external or of something internal to a person. If it is of something external, such as of God, then the sight of it causes enjoyment. If it is of the internal state, then it brings about a realization that one is content, at least in some aspect, and no [...]

In order to prove that being and (2nd-level metaphysical) goodness are the same “really,” we have to show both that whatever has being is good and that whatever is good has being. Aquinas’ argument in (ST, I, 5, 1) proves the second part of the conjunction. To sum it up: that is good which is [...]

Reposting with an update. There are several ways to think about the four causes: (1) Form and matter are concerned with an object’s essence, while the efficient and final causes, with its existence. The former two ask, What is X? (E.g., such and such form-in-matter.) The latter, What makes X exist? (E.g., such and such [...]