I promised her rings for her fingers,
Sparkling flowers for her flaxen hair;
I swore that I’d never set sail in foul weather,
But stay by her side at the shore.

Fare thee well, oh ye Barbary merchants,
Fare thee well to the Spanish blockade,
Fare thee well to the siege of Gibraltar,
And the treacherous seas of Cathay!

I gave her my word to be married,
And took her sweet vows in return;
I swore that I’d never set sail in foul weather,
But stay by her side at the shore.

Fare thee well, oh ye Barbary merchants,
Fare thee well to the Spanish blockade,
Fare thee well to the siege of Gibraltar,
And the treacherous seas of Cathay!

I built her a cottage in Chatham,
Gave her children to sit by the fire;
I swore that I’ll never set sail in foul weather,
But stay at her side at the shore.

Fare thee well, oh ye Barbary merchants,
Fare thee well to the Spanish blockade,
Fare thee well to the siege of Gibraltar,
And the treacherous seas of Cathay!

But our country’s too small for a sailor
Without the blue sea and the sky;
Though I swore that I’d never set sail in foul weather,
I left her behind at the shore.

Take me back, oh ye Barbary merchants,
Let me risk at the Spanish blockade,
Carry me to the siege of Gibraltar,
And the treacherous seas of Cathay!

May the Lord of blogs be with you always. (Reply: “And also with you”; that is, me.)

Now consider the following questions: Could Richard Nixon have been a different

(1) entity
(2) man
(3) president
(4) Nixon

than what he in fact was?

Answers:

(1) Since every property is accidental to Nixon qua entity, yes. There is no reason why he could not be, say, a bottle of wine.
(2) Yes, if, e.g., he had been, contrary to fact, defeated by Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election.
(3) Yes, if he had not been implicated in Watergate, or if he had disliked poker, etc.
(4) No, because every property of Nixon is now essential to him.

So, sortals do change the outcome in questions of trans-world identity.

On Kripke’s theory we could simply stipulate that in a possible world I am currently considering that fat male sailor is Cleopatra. The possible worlds are ours to play with. But, someone who worries about trans-world identity might object: really, what would that accomplish? We have to figure out when identity is preserved through change and when it is not. What we are dealing with, then, is a perturbation problem: How much can we muck around with Cleopatra’s character before it would no longer be reasonable to call her by her actual-world name?

The main question regarding trans-world identity is, Which of your properties are essential and which are accidental to you? If is clear that Cleopatra can’t be a musical performance, because it is her essence to be human. The name Cleopatra is a rigid designator vis-a-vis her humanity: it picks out a human being in all possible worlds in which Cleopatra exists. On the other hand, it is probably not her essence to be blond, though who knows: if she had not been blonde, Mark Anthony might not have taken a liking to her. But what of a property like being female? I think that between essential and accidental properties we must situate something called “proper accidents.” A proper accident is not officially part of the essence of a thing, but it follows from its essence, such that to remove it would change the thing into a monster. One standard example is the capacity of laughing: a human being is not defined by it, but a creature who is incapable of laughter would scarcely be human. Cleopatra’s being female would seem to be her proper accident; it is arguable that she would be unrecognizable if she were put into the body of a male.

Thus, as Robert M. Adams puts it, we must engage in both “conceptual legislation” and “metaphysical discovery.” (182)

Perhaps I can evoke the appropriate sense of bewilderment as follows. Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational. But what of an individual who counts amond his eccentricities both mathematics and cycling? Is this concrete individual necessarily rational and contingently two-legged or vice versa? (quoted in Metaphysics: An Anthology, 145)

This is a case of confusion of necessity of the consequent with necessity of the consequence. In order to conclude that

(30) Zwier is necessarily bipedal,

we need

(31) Cyclists are necessarily bipedal

and

(32) Zwier is a cyclist.

But (31) can be read as N(X is a cyclist → X is bipedal), in which case it’s true, yet (30) does not follow; or as (X is a cyclist → N(X is bipedal)), from which (30) would follow but which is unfortunately false.

In other words, we have the following 4 true statements:

(1) N(X is a mathematician → X is rational)
(2) ~N(X is a mathematician → X is bipedal)
(3) N(X is a cyclist → X is bipedal)
(4) ~N(X is a cyclist → X is rational).

Suppose in the actual world X is both a mathematician and a cyclist. Then he is both rational and bipedial. Suppose in some world W our X is a cyclist and is irrational. Then in that world he is not a mathematician. And so on. Whence the bewilderment?

The argument continues in Plantinga’s The Nature of Necessity, which I’ve yet to read.

2. Suppose it’s true that “the people reconsidered their sovereignty, and created a new institution, wiping the slate clean, more or less, and instituting a sovereign federal government, while vesting other elements of their sovereignty in state governments.” This simple statement does not attempt to prove that those “other elements of their sovereignty” do not include the legal Constitutional right to secede. But we can say more. The Constitution enumerates certain particular limited powers that the federal government has. The Bill of Rights is in principle unnecessary, because the freedoms secured therein could be deduced from the text of the original Constitution. Where in that document does it say that the “more perfect Union” can only expand and never contract in territory, member states, or people? The Union was certainly not called “perpetual” or anything like that. So, where does the Constitution say that the feds can or must preserve the union by preventing any and all secessions?

Here is another argument. The Constitution had to be ratified by nine out of thirteen states, and any amendment must be agreed to by 3/4th of state legislatures. Before that 2/3rd of the Senate must also vote for it, Senators being chosen by state legislatures until the 17th amendment was passed in 1913. Speaking of Madison, he also wrote that “it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.” (F #39) A clear case can be made that the Constitution is in part a creature of the people and a creature of states.

In other words, Timothy can point to the Preamble: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union…” But I can point to the Postscript: “Resolved, That the preceding Constitution… should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification… Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution,” etc.

3. Timothy has misunderstood my point about individual secession. His argument is that the Constitution was not a compact between the states but between the people living on the territory to be overshadowed by the future federal government. Therefore, no state could lawfully secede. But if secession by states is to be considered illegal for that reason only, then secession of individuals should be perfectly legal, precisely because the federal government resulted from a compact between them. Any person who made a compact could break it; otherwise, he and his children would be slaves in perpetuity, and as Rothbard well demonstrated, one cannot alienate his will. Surely, then, I should be able to form my own nation where my house stands. But what if I am able to convince the majority of my fellow Ohioans to join forces with me in declaring independence of the United States, that is, forming a new country with themselves and their private properties ? If I can do it alone, then that majority can do it, too, without physically leaving the United States or being imprisoned for “treason.” There, you have your perfectly legal secession of a state.

4. If Timothy does not advocate massive wars to punish bribe-taking officials, then neither should he defend a military assault of the North on the South to punish slave-owners or to fight for the rights of slaves.

5. Sumter, Shmumter; there is evidence that Lincoln provoked the South into firing the first shot. At any rate, that’s just one of the many INUS causes (an insufficient but necessary component cause which is a part of an unnecessary but sufficient total cause) which sparked the war. There were a whole bunch of reasons for the Civil War, and both slavery and economics were still more INUSes.