G.E. Moore stuns me. He spends the first 150 pages in Principia Ethica trying to prove that what might be termed “strong Hedonism” or the view that pleasure is the sole good to be wrong. He is right about that, but, as I began to realize with ever greater amazement toward the end of the book, he was not going to offer us an account of things other than happiness that he himself considered to be good. He does say that consciousness of pleasure or of beauty is a good distinct from pleasure and also seems to be a good thing. First, this is beside the point: happiness is not merely pleasure understood as contentment of the will. Moore is fighting a straw man. But secondly, he can’t really believe that “pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects” exhaust the number of good things.
Yet Moore does the strong Hedonists one better. In Chapter 5 he proposes to test the rule “Do not murder.” And this is what he says: “In order to prove that murder, if it were so universally adopted as to cause the speedy extermination of the race, would not be good as a means, we should have to disprove the main contention of pessimism – namely that the existence of human life in on the whole an evil. And the view of pessimism, however strongly we may be convinced of its truth or falsehood, is one which never has been either proved or refuted conclusively.” (156) Moore takes individual preferences so seriously that he must claim that if I wanted to die, it would be good for a society to offer free handguns so that I could off myself with as much efficiency as possible. I am sure that even Mill would recoil from that conclusion of utilitarianism. Indeed, this is precisely one of the dilemmas of pure utilitarianism (of which there are 4 kinds overall), namely, conflicts between virtue and narrow happiness (defined as satisfactions of desires, whatever they are). That Moore does not realize that this is even a problem indicates that he does not have a clue about ethics.
But wait, there is more! “Our ‘duty’ is merely that which will be a means to the best possible, and the expedient, if it is really expedient, must be just the same.” (167) Another kind of utilitarian dilemmas, namely, conflicts between act and rule utilitarianism, is with glazed eyes passed over by Moore in favor of act utilitarianism. In a paradoxical self-contradiction, just a few pages earlier Moore defends the idea that “the individual can therefore be confidently recommended always to conform to rules which are both generally useful and generally practiced,” (164) in which the conflict is resolved 100% in favor of rule utilitarianism. Does Moore remember what he writes from one moment to the next?
Hedonism comes back with a vengeance on p. 172. “If it could be shown of any particular disposition, commonly considered virtuous, that it was generally harmful, we should at once say: Then it is not really virtuous.” For Moore then, the virtuous man is he who does the most convenient to him thing as any given moment; “virtues have, in general, no intrinsic value whatsoever.” The essential distinction between virtue and narrow happiness that, if made, makes, and if not made, breaks, ethics is not made.
You think Moore is done? Far from it. “‘My own good’ only denotes some event affecting me, which is good absolutely and objectively; it is the thing, and not its goodness, which is mine; everything else must be either ‘a part of universal good’ or else not good at all; there is no third alternative conception ‘good for me.’” (170) This is wrong through and through. First, the value “good” or “bad” / “evil” is a result of a judgment. It is human beings who judge by themselves and for themselves what is and is not good. Precisely for that reason all goods are relativized to individuals. Moore assumes the position of an impartial spectator, but that is also a relativization to the spectator whose happiness consists of the greatest happiness of all. Absolute good exists; for example, an object which satisfies all human desires is an absolute good, or the thing than which no greater can be thought is an absolute good, but there is no “absolute good” in the sense that Moore attaches to it. There is metaphysical good, but it, too, obtains its character of goodness in relation to the wisdom and will of a rational being. Second, the third out of four sources of utilitarian dilemmas, namely, the need to privilege oneself and one’s loved ones in many situations which violates the utilitarian impartiality, is totally ignored. If I am playing a game of chess, then I am trying to win and to harm my opponent. I cannot be a spectator watching myself play. I must be in the game, in the moment, giving it all I’ve got. If I watch myself play, I will most definitely lose, yet from the utilitarian perspective it does not matter whether the utility of victory goes to me or to the other player.
Moore’s book is of limited utility.
Ah yes, and the fourth kind of utilitarian dilemmas consists of two parts. First, how one ought to distribute happiness among people if he is in a position to do so, and second, whether we take total or average happiness as our mark.