In Chapter 2 of his Christian Philosophical Theology, Stephen T. Davis presents an astonishingly crude, primitive, even pathetic "cosmological" argument for the existence of "God." That this argument fails to prove anything is made clear in the next chapter, where Davis writes: "But even if we know or rationally believe that God exists, it is still an open question what God is like, that is, what God's attributes are. There are many sorts of Gods, gods, and divine beings in the various religions of the world. What is God like?" (37)
Replace the word God with the word "Croomp." Would Davis say that his argument proves Croomp's existence? Of course, he can't say that, because in Chapter 2 "Croomp" is a meaningless term, as is the proposition "Croomp exists."
One needs to show, one argument after another, how something with a highly peculiar attribute X, such that X is not shared by creatures or universe as a whole either in quality or in eminence, exists, and conclude the proof with "and this everyone understands to be God" (or Croomp). Davis attempts no such feat, which is why his argument fails.