Ronald Dworkin writes:
In many cases, however, corresponding rights and duties are not correlative, but one is derivative from the other, and it makes a difference which is derivative from which.
There is a difference between the idea that you have a duty not to lie to me because I have a right not to be lied to, and the idea that I have a right that you do not lie to me because you have a duty not to tell lies.
Perhaps you have an independent (moral) duty not to spout random lies, even if your lies are not believed, because lying is malicious and so a sin which will harm you the sinner. But I have no (legal) right not to be lied to, because you have freedom of speech.
On the other hand, when you and I sign a contract, you have no foundational duty not to lie, if lying is not intended to harm others but simply cleverly to promote your own self-interest. There is no explicit malice, only “prudence.” But I have a legal right not to be lied to, as this would constitute fraud.